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The NCAA’s Transfer Rules:
An Antitrust Analysis
Roger D. Blair* and Wenche Wang**
Abstract
In Deppe v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,1 the Seventh Circuit
accepted the NCAA’s argument that its transfer rules are presumptively
procompetitive. It also approved the NCAA’s no-poaching agreement. This
Article analyzes these NCAA-imposed restraints and finds them inconsistent
with current antitrust policy.
Introduction
For decades, the NCAA has imposed strict transfer rules, restricting
student-athletes’ ability to transfer from one university to another. Past legal
complaints about the NCAA’s transfer rules have largely failed.2 Most re-
cently, in Deppe v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Peter Deppe, a stu-
dent athlete, challenged the NCAA’s transfer rules as a horizontal agreement
in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.3 The Seventh Circuit rejected
Deppe’s claim and found the transfer rules to be presumptively procompeti-
* Department of Economics, University of Florida and Affiliate Faculty of Law,
University of Florida
** Sport Management, School of Kinesiology, University of Michigan,
respectively. We appreciate the useful comments provided by Ryan Rodenberg.
Disclaimer: Neither of the authors participated in the litigation examined in this
paper.
1 893 F.3d 498 (7th Cir. 2018)
2 See, e.g., Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001); Agnew v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 328 (7th Cir. 2012); Pugh v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:15-cv-01747-TWP-DKL, 2016 WL 5394408, at
*3 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 27, 2016).
3 893 F.3d 498 (7th Cir. 2018); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018)
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tive.4 Its foundation for this sweeping conclusion can be traced to dicta in
the Supreme Court’s opinion in National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.5
In this Article, we examine the inferences drawn by the Seventh Circuit
and, in short, we find them wanting. First, in Part I, we review the back-
ground surrounding Deppe’s suit. Second, in Part II, we present the Seventh
Circuit’s decision and the foundation for that decision. Third, in Part III, we
discuss the Seventh Circuit’s views on the competitive significance of the
NCAA’s no-poaching rules. Here, we observe that the Seventh Circuit is
out-of-step with current antitrust enforcement. We introduce the Depart-
ment of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s Antitrust Guidance for
Human Resources Professionals and compare that guidance to the NCAA’s con-
duct. Fourth, in Part IV, we argue that the NCAA would not prevail if its
transfer rules and no-poaching rules were subject to a rule of reason analysis.
Fifth—and finally—in Part V, we close with some concluding remarks.
I. Peter Deppe’s Complaint
Peter Deppe, a star punter from Almont High School in Michigan,
received athletic-scholarship offers from several college football teams.6 In
the end, he elected to attend Northern Illinois University without a scholar-
ship as a “walk-on.”7 For his first year at Northern Illinois, Deppe decided
to “red-shirt,” which meant that he could practice and train with the team
but he could not participate in games.8 During that first year, his position
coach told him that he would receive an athletic scholarship for his second
year.9 When his position coach left Northern Illinois, however, the head
coach informed Deppe that the team would not award him a scholarship
because they were recruiting another punter.10
Without a scholarship or the prospect of playing time, Deppe decided
to transfer to another school.11 Even though Deppe had been a red-shirt
walk-on at Northern Illinois—that is, a non-playing and non-scholarship
member of the football team—the NCAA’s transfer rule, Bylaw 14.5.5, still
4 Deppe, 893 F.3d at 503–04.
5 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
6 See Deppe, 893 F.3d at 499.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
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applied.12 Thus, he had to obtain permission from Northern Illinois to
transfer to another Division I school.13 Additionally, he would have to sit
out for the entire academic year following his transfer.14 This rule hurt
Deppe since the University of Iowa wanted him to join their team, but only
if he could play immediately.15 Deppe requested an exception to the transfer
rule so that he could play immediately at Iowa,16 but NCAA rules prohib-
ited Deppe—the student-athlete—from requesting an exception.17 Only the
University of Iowa, the transferee school, could request such a waiver.18
Iowa, however, decided to move on to another punter and was no longer
interested in Deppe.19 When the NCAA refused to consider his request,
Deppe filed an antitrust suit alleging that the transfer rule was an unreason-
able restraint of trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.20 As we will
discuss, Deppe’s suit failed because of the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of
Board of Regents.
II. The Seventh Circuit’s Presumption of Pro-Competitiveness
Deppe’s antitrust challenge can be traced to the Supreme Court’s
largely deferential attitude toward the NCAA. In Board of Regents, the issue
involved the legality of the NCAA’s plainly anticompetitive television plan,
which limited the quantity and quality of televised college football games.21
Ordinarily, such an agreement would have been condemned as a per se viola-
tion of § 1 of the Sherman Act.22 But in Board of Regents, the Court recog-
nized the historical importance of the NCAA:
12 Id.; see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 2017–18 NCAA Division I
Manual ¶ 14.5.5 (2017) [hereinafter NCAA Manual], http://www.ncaapublications
.com/productdownloads/D118.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FUK-KGRX].
13 See Deppe, 893 F.3d at 500.
14 Id. Transfers attend school and train with the team but cannot compete in
intercollegiate athletic events.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 500; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (providing that “[e]very contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states . . . is hereby declared to be illegal”). Currently, a violation of § 1 is a felony.
Firms face maximum fines of $100 million, while individuals face maximum fines
of $1 million and/or maximum prison sentences of ten years. Id.
21 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 88 (1984).
22 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
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Since its inception in 1905, the NCAA has played an important role in the
regulation of amateur collegiate sports. It has adopted and promulgated
playing rules, standards of amateurism, standards for academic eligibility,
regulations concerning recruitment of athletes, and rules governing the
size of athletic squads and coaching staffs.23
The Court did not explain its apparent approval of recruiting restraints
as well as limits on the number of players and coaches per team.24 Because
these limits are binding, they inhibit competition on these dimensions.
Though these restraints tend to reduce costs and thereby improve profitabil-
ity, they likely decrease quality. These restraints can only be maintained
through collaboration among NCAA members, because otherwise, competi-
tive pressure would incentivize the members to gain a competitive advan-
tage by not abiding by the rules. Since the Court thought these restraints
necessary, it refused to treat the NCAA’s agreements as a per se violation:
Our decision not to apply a per se rule to this case rests in large part on our
recognition that a certain degree of cooperation is necessary if the type of
competition that petitioner and its member institutions seek to market is
to be preserved. It is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory
controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition
among amateur athletic teams and therefore procompetitive because they
enhance public interest in intercollegiate athletics.25
The Supreme Court failed to cite empirical evidence for its assertion that the
NCAA’s restraints, which protect amateurism, enhance public interest in
intercollegiate athletics. Thus, the Supreme Court’s conclusion was based
entirely on conjecture. Without sound and relevant evidence, there is no
theoretical or empirical foundation to justify the NCAA’s restraints as a
general proposition.26 The Supreme Court laid the foundation for future
misadventures with the following broad conclusory statement:
The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition of
amateurism in college sports. There can be no question but that it needs
ample latitude to play that role, or that the preservation of the student-
athlete in higher education adds richness and diversity to intercollegiate
athletics and is entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act. But
23 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 88.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 117.
26 It comes as no surprise that the NCAA would restrict student-athletes to be
amateurs and change the definition of amateurism over time to suit its needs. It is
also no surprise that the NCAA would revere a tradition that limits payment to
student-athletes.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLS\11-1\HLS101.txt unknown Seq: 5  5-FEB-20 13:53
2020 / The NCAA’s Transfer Rules: An Antitrust Analysis 5
consistent with the Sherman Act, the role of the NCAA must be to pre-
serve a tradition that might otherwise die.27
In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court distinguished the anticompeti-
tive restrictions in the NCAA’s television plan from “rules defining the con-
ditions of the contest, the eligibility of participants, or the manner in which
members of a joint enterprise shall share the responsibilities and the benefits
of the total venture.”28 From this statement, the Seventh Circuit inferred
that all eligibility rules are procompetitive.29 And since the Seventh Circuit
considered the NCAA’s transfer rules to be eligibility rules, the Seventh
Circuit deemed the NCAA’s transfer rules presumptively procompetitive
without requiring further inquiry.
The NCAA’s transfer rule—Bylaw 14.5.5.1—frustrated Deppe’s ef-
forts to transfer from Northern Illinois University to the University of Iowa.
Bylaw 14.5.5.1 specifically provides that “[a] transfer student from a four-
year institution shall not be eligible for intercollegiate competition at a
member institution until the student has fulfilled a residence requirement of
one full academic year (two full semesters or three full quarters) at the certi-
fying institution.”30 Deppe alleged that this rule violates § 1 of the Sherman
Act because it unreasonably restrains trade or commerce.31
As an economic matter, there is a clear employment relationship be-
tween the student-athlete and the school. Indeed, a student-athlete on an
athletic scholarship receives both payment in kind and an educational op-
portunity, while the school receives a commitment from the student-athlete
to train, practice, and participate in competition. But the NCAA’s transfer
rule adds friction to this market. For a school receiving a transferring stu-
dent-athlete, this rule is an obvious cost, as the school may have to pay the
student-athlete in kind while the student cannot compete. For the student-
athlete, sitting out a year at a new school inhibits her incentive to switch
27 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
28 Id. at 117.
29 Deppe v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 893 F.3d 498, 501 (7th Cir. 2018).
30 Id. at 500 (quoting NCAA Manual, supra note 12, ¶ 14.5.5.1). There are some
exceptions to this rule which can be found in the NCAA Manual. Notably, students
in Division I sports outside of basketball, baseball, bowl subdivision football, and
ice hockey have a one-time transfer exception to this rule. That is, if a student in a
sport other than those listed has not previously transferred, she may qualify to im-
mediately begin playing at another institution without the year in residence re-
quirement. See NCAA Manual, supra note 12, ¶ 14.5.5.2.10. Additionally, if the
student was dismissed or non-sponsored, the transfer rule may not apply. See id.
¶ 14.2.1.5.
31 Deppe, 893 F.3d at 500.
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schools, even when an opportunity arises that could help her career. Alto-
gether, the NCAA’s transfer rule impairs competition.32
In Deppe, the district court recognized that the NCAA is ordinarily
subject to the antitrust laws and that its restraints are evaluated under the
rule of reason.33 The district court also observed that “most—if not all—
eligibility rules . . . fall comfortably within the presumption of procompeti-
tiveness afforded to certain NCAA regulations.”34 The district court deter-
mined that the eligibility rules “do not violate the antitrust laws,” noting
that “[t]he eligibility rules create the product [of college football] and allow
its survival in the face of commercializing pressures.”35 Accordingly, because
the challenged bylaw was directly related to eligibility, the court deemed it
presumptively procompetitive, thus requiring no further analysis under the
Sherman Act.
The district court began by addressing the issue of whether the chal-
lenged restraint was procompetitive. If the bylaw was presumptively
procompetitive, then there is no need for a rule of reason analysis because the
bylaw is per se lawful. The district court also pointed out that the transfer
regulation falls under Article 14 in the NCAA Division I Manual, which
addresses the eligibility of student athletes. Pointing to an earlier Seventh
Circuit decision in Agnew v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,36 where it
held that “most [of the Association’s] regulations will be a ‘justifiable
means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams,’” 37 and a
prior district court decision in Pugh v. National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
32 See Joan Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect Competition, ch. 26.
(1933). The labor economics literature has found that frictions in the labor market
result in monopsonistic exploitation, which Joan Robinson defined as the gap be-
tween labor’s marginal revenue product and the wage paid; see also Alan Man-
ning, Imperfect Competition in the Labor Market, in Handbook of Labor Economics
973–1041 (Vol. 4b 2011) (identifying employer collusion as one source of monop-
sony power in the labor market). The report also explained the adverse consequences
of monopsony.
33 See Deppe v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, Case No. 1-16-cv-00528-TWP-
DKL, 2017 WL 897303, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2017).
34 Id. at *4 (citing Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 328
(7th Cir. 2012)).
35 See id. (quoting McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F.2d
1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1988)).
36 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012).
37 Id. at 341 (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984)).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLS\11-1\HLS101.txt unknown Seq: 7  5-FEB-20 13:53
2020 / The NCAA’s Transfer Rules: An Antitrust Analysis 7
tion,38 the court determined that eligibility rules are presumptively
procompetitive.39
This concluded the matter in the district court, but Deppe appealed to
the Seventh Circuit. In its decision, the Seventh Circuit began by observing
that “[t]he year-in-residence requirement is an eligibility rule clearly meant
to preserve the amateur character of college athletics and is therefore pre-
sumptively procompetitive under Board of Regents.” 40 The court’s reasoning
is strained here. To be an “amateur,” a student-athlete must not receive
compensation greater than the NCAA-approved maximum.41 It is far from
clear how the residency requirement for transferring students relates to ama-
teurism.42 Having determined that the transfer rule was presumptively
procompetitive, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
Deppe’s case.43
The central problem with this inference is the lack of analysis of the
NCAA’s transfer rules by the Supreme Court. In Board of Regents, the issue
did not involve transfer rules or eligibility rules.44 And the Supreme Court
has never made a finding on the competitive significance of these restraints.
But in Deppe, the Seventh Circuit continued to rely on its strained interpre-
tation of Board of Regents:
Importantly here, we also explained that most—if not all—eligibility
rules fall within the presumption of pro-competitiveness established in
Board of Regents. After all, the Supreme Court explicitly mentioned eligi-
bility rules as a type that fits into the same mold as other procompetitive
rules. And because eligibility rules define what it means to be an amateur
or a student-athlete, they are essential to the very existence of the product
of college football.45
38 No. 1:15-cv-01747-TWP-DKL, 2016 WL 5394408, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Sept.
27, 2016).
39 Deppe, 2017 WL 897307, at *3.
40 Deppe v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 893 F.3d 498, 501 (7th Cir. 2018).
41 See NCAA Manual, supra note 12, ¶ 12.1.2.
42 Id. ¶ 13.11.2.4.2.
43 See Deppe, 893 F.3d at 501. Yet the court later provided some fanciful argu-
ments. For example, referring to athletes in the high-revenue sports of football,
men’s basketball, and ice hockey, the Seventh Circuit speculated that “[w]ithout
transfer restrictions, the players in these high-revenue sports could be traded like
professional athletes.” Id. This inference is absurd. Student-athletes are not owned
by member institutions and there has never been a suggestion that transfers to an-
other school could be compelled. Moreover, the existing rule would only make such
“trades” more expensive; it would not preclude them.
44 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 136 (1984).
45 See Deppe, 893 F.3d at 502 (alterations and citations omitted).
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The NCAA’s transfer rules are unnecessary to preserve amateurism.
These rules do, however, inhibit some forms of competition and thereby
improve the profits earned by the NCAA’s members. Thus, the rules tend to
be anticompetitive rather than procompetitive.
The economic effect of the NCAA’s transfer rules are clear. For the
student-athlete, the cost of transferring is higher than it would be in the
absence of the restraint. Requesting permission to transfer may be a daunt-
ing prospect for some eighteen- to twenty-one-year-old student-athletes.
More importantly, however, the transferring student-athlete cannot compete
until she has been in residence at the new school for a full academic year.
Because demand functions are negatively-sloped, these costs reduce the equi-
librium number of transfers.
Schools losing a transferring student-athlete sometimes welcome such
transfers. For example, if an athlete is disgruntled or not performing well,
the school may wish to reallocate the scholarship to someone else. In other
cases, however, the school may wish to retain a player, perhaps to fill an
important backup position. In that event, the school may make it difficult
for a student-athlete to transfer. Thus, the Transfer Regulation Bylaw 14.5.5
has costs and benefits: costs for the students and benefits for the school.
III. The NCAA’s No-Poaching Agreements
In addition to endorsing the NCAA’s transfer rules, the Seventh Cir-
cuit observed that the NCAA rules also prohibit schools from soliciting a
student-athlete enrolled at another school.46 Referenced in Bylaw 14.5.5,
but detailed in Bylaw 13.1.1.3, the rule states that:
An athletics staff member or other representative of the institution’s ath-
letics interests shall not make contact with the student-athlete of another
NCAA or NAIA four-year collegiate institution, directly or indirectly,
without first obtaining the written permission of the first institution’s ath-
letics director (or an athletics administrator designated by the athletics
director) to do so, regardless of who makes the initial contact. If permis-
sion is not granted, the second institution shall not encourage the transfer
and the institution shall not provide athletically related financial assistance
to the student-athlete until the student-athlete has attended the second
institution for one academic year. If permission is granted to contact the
student-athlete, all applicable NCAA recruiting rules apply.47
46 See id. at 503.
47 NCAA Manual, supra note 12, ¶ 13.1.1.3.
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Thus, the NCAA Bylaws, which govern the conduct of its members, forbid
solicitation. For example, if the University of Tennessee were to invite the
University of Alabama’s backup linebacker to transfer to Tennessee, such an
action would constitute illegal poaching by Tennessee under Bylaw
13.1.1.3. Violations of NCAA Bylaws can result in severe sanctions, such as
a ban on bowl-game participation, loss of championships, forfeiture of
games, and loss of scholarships.
A no-poaching agreement is an agreement among employers to refrain
from hiring one another’s employees. The purpose of such agreements is to
eliminate a form of competition in the labor market. Because these agree-
ments suppress wages and other forms of compensation,48 the NCAA’s ban
on solicitation is clearly anticompetitive.
In Deppe, however, the Seventh Circuit appears to disapprove of
“poaching.”49 Indeed, the court seems to suggest that because poaching
happens in professional sports, allowing it in the NCAA would be inconsis-
tent with the preservation of amateurism.50 But this presumption is mis-
informed because the four major sports leagues—Major League Baseball, the
National Basketball Association, the National Football League, and the Na-
tional Hockey League—all have anti-tampering provisions, or no-poaching
rules that forbid such competition.51 For example, Major League Baseball’s
anti-tampering rule is similar to the NCAA’s no-poaching bylaw: absent
current employer permission, “negotiations [and] dealings respecting em-
ployment, either present or prospective, between any player, coach or man-
ager and any Major or Minor League Club other than the Club with which
the player is under contract” are prohibited.52 In the case of the four major
professional sports leagues—all of which are unionized—the no-poaching
agreements avoid antitrust prosecution because they are the product of col-
lective bargaining.53 In contrast, student-athletes are not unionized, but
48 See Oz Shy & Rune Stenbacka, Anti-Poaching Agreements in Labor Markets, 57
Econ. Inquiry 243, 243 (2018) (analyzing the economic effects of no-poaching agree-
ments in a duopoly model of wage competition and finding that employers enjoy
higher profits while the employees are worse off).
49 See Deppe, 893 F.3d at 503.
50 See id.
51 For an examination of the anti-tampering rules in the major sports leagues, see
Roger D. Blair & John E. Lopatka, The Economic Effects of Anti-Tampering Rules in
Professional Sports Leagues, 38 Managerial & Decision Econ. 704 (2017).
52 See The Official Professional Baseball Rules Book, Major League
Baseball, Rule 3(k) (2019), https://registration.mlbpa.org/pdf/MajorLeagueRules
.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2VH-MDQU].
53 For a compact discussion of the labor exemptions, see American Bar Associ-
ation, Antitrust Law Developments 1491–99 (8th ed. 2017).
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should be considered employees. Thus, the NCAA’s no-poaching rules—
unlike those in unionized professional sports leagues—should be subject to
antitrust scrutiny.
Notably, the Seventh Circuit refers to poaching in a way that suggests
poaching is undesirable.54 But poaching is simply another word for a specific
form of competition. If a good player receives expressions of interest from
other teams, the pursuit of this player would increase competition among
the teams. Because a fundamental premise of the Sherman Act is that com-
petition is socially desirable, one cannot defend a restraint of trade on the
grounds that competition is undesirable.55
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit’s view of no-poaching agreements is out-
of-step with current antitrust enforcement. In United States v. Adobe Systems,
Inc., the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) challenged the legality of no-poach-
ing agreements among Adobe Systems, Apple, Google, Intel, Intuit, and
Pixar.56 Similarly, in United States v. Lucasfilm, Inc., the DOJ alleged that a
no-poaching agreement among digital animators violated § 1 of the Sher-
man Act.57 Likewise, in United States v. eBay, Inc., the DOJ challenged a no-
solicitation and no-hiring agreement between eBay and Intuit, Inc.58 In each
suit, the DOJ reached consent decrees with the defendants. Subsequent pri-
vate suits have resulted in payments of hundreds of millions of dollars to
those injured by the agreements not to compete.59
54 See Deppe, 893 F.3d at 503.
55 See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 773 (1975); United States v.
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978) (“In sum, the Rule of Reason
does not support a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is
unreasonable.”).
56 See United States v. Adobe Sys., Inc., Case No. 1:10-cv-01629, 2011 WL
10883994, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2011).
57 See United States v. Lucasfilm, Inc., Case No. 1:10-cv-02220, 2011 WL
2636850, at *1 (D.D.C. June 3, 2011).
58 See United States v. eBay, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
59 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). No-
poaching agreements suppress wages and salaries as well as other forms of compen-
sation. Those employees who are denied the benefits of competition will have suf-
fered antitrust injury and would appear to have standing to sue for treble damages.
The damage suffered by an employee is the difference between the compensation
that she would have received but for the unlawful agreement and the actual com-
pensation. For student-athletes, the estimation of damages poses a daunting empiri-
cal challenge. Nonetheless, student-athletes who have been denied the benefits of
competition should be able to prove their magnitude. In Adobe, the eventual settle-
ment amounted to roughly $415 million. See David Streitfeld, Bigger Settlement Said
to Be Reached in Silicon Valley Antitrust Case, N.Y. Times (Jan. 14, 2015), https://
nyti.ms/1DYcPO4 [https://perma.cc/64G7-X77B].
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In the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”)
Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals, the antitrust agencies ex-
plain their view that no-poaching agreements are per se violations of § 1 of
the Sherman Act.60 They have warned that the DOJ will begin pursuing no-
poaching agreements as criminal violations. This antitrust enforcement pol-
icy is clearly inconsistent with the Seventh Circuit’s holdings in Deppe.
“Naked . . . no-poaching agreements among employers . . . are per se
illegal under the antitrust laws.”61 To escape the “naked” label, the NCAA
would have to show that the no-poaching agreements were reasonably neces-
sary to maintain the system of intercollegiate athletics. This, it cannot do. In
its Antitrust Guidance, the antitrust agencies advised the community of
human resource professionals that “[a]greements among employers not to
recruit certain employees or not to compete on terms of compensation are
illegal.”62 In the Antitrust Guidance, the DOJ warned that it “intends to
proceed criminally against naked . . . no poaching agreements.”63 The agen-
cies make it clear that the antitrust laws pertain to nonprofit organizations,
which would also include colleges and universities.64
IV. Rule of Reason Analysis
No one disputes that the NCAA is subject to the antitrust laws. As a
result of the Supreme Court’s Board of Regents decision, however, the
NCAA’s restraints must be analyzed under the “rule of reason” unless they
are presumptively procompetitive. A rule of reason inquiry is aimed at de-
termining whether a restraint is competitively reasonable. If it is, the re-
60 Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div. & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Gui-
dance for Human Resource Professionals 3 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/public-
statements/2016/10/antitrust-guidance-human-resource-professionals-department-
justice [https://perma.cc/6X7B-YP4L]. The Antitrust Guidance is not legally bind-
ing, but the agencies make it clear that they will challenge no-poaching agreements.
See id. at 2.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 4.
64 See Seaman v. Duke Univ., No. 1:15-CV462, 2016 WL 1043473 (M.D.N.C.
Feb. 12, 2016). The nonprofit status of the NCAA’s members will not protect them
from antitrust exposure. Duke University and the University of North Carolina—
Chapel Hill allegedly agreed not to poach one another’s medical staff. They both
recently reached settlements. See Jake Satisky, Duke agrees to pay $54.5 million to settle
class action lawsuit, Duke Chronicle (May 25, 2019), https://www.dukechronicle
.com/article/2019/05/duke-university-settles-class-action-lawsuit-for-54-5-million
[https://perma.cc/L3S2-3SM7].
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straint will be lawful. If it is not, it will violate § 1 of the Sherman Act. In
addition to fines, the NCAA would be vulnerable to private damage ac-
tions.65 In that event, the damages caused by the antitrust violation would
be tripled automatically. The sums involved could be staggering. In 2018,
there were about 179,200 student-athletes in Division I schools. Even if the
damage to each athlete was only $1,000, the actual damages would amount
to about $180,000,000. This sum would be tripled automatically to
$540,000,000. The NCAA and its members will have a difficult time de-
fending some of their restraints under a rule of reason analysis.
In broad strokes, there are three stages in a rule of reason analysis.66
First, the plaintiff must make a prima facie case that the challenged restraint
was anticompetitive. In response, the defendant may disprove the allegation
as a factual matter. Alternatively, the defendant may offer a procompetitive
justification for the challenged conduct. The plaintiff can rebut this response
by disproving the facts alleged or by showing that a less restrictive alterna-
tive is available. The trier of fact must then decide whether, on balance, the
restraint is beneficial or detrimental.
A. Application of the Rule of Reason to the NCAA’s Transfer Regulations
In Deppe’s case, the complaint involved the NCAA’s requirement that
a student-athlete sit out a year at the new school. The prima facie argument
is straightforward: the NCAA rule imposes additional costs for transferees
and thereby hinders the allocation of scarce resources. Some would-be trans-
ferees will be deterred from transferring. Some student-athletes will transfer
and be forced to sit out. If the new school would have given these student-
athletes playing time but for the NCAA rule, that school’s team would not
be as good as it could have been absent the restraint. Thus, there is a misal-
location of resources that decreases the quality of the output.
Faced with this argument, the NCAA would have to disprove the alle-
gation or offer a procompetitive justification for the challenged conduct.
This, the NCAA cannot do. First, the restraint is stated clearly in Bylaw
13.1.1.3, which is the product of agreement among the NCAA members.67
There is no way to disprove the fact of the agreement. The economic impact
of the rule cannot be denied. It is basic economics—if the cost of an activity
65 See generally Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, Antitrust Econom-
ics ¶¶ 71–93 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed. 2008); Philip Areeda et al., Anti-
trust Law ¶¶ 390–99 (Wolters Kluwer, 4th ed. 2014).
66 See generally Philip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law,
¶¶ 1500–12 (Wolters Kluwer, 4th ed. 2017).
67 NCAA Manual, supra note 12, ¶ 13.1.1.3.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLS\11-1\HLS101.txt unknown Seq: 13  5-FEB-20 13:53
2020 / The NCAA’s Transfer Rules: An Antitrust Analysis 13
increases, demand for that activity will decrease. The NCAA, therefore,
must offer a procompetitive justification.
The NCAA may turn to the argument of amateurism, but the transfer
rule has nothing to do with “preserving amateurism.” The compensation
paid to a student-athlete may rise following a transfer, but the total amount
cannot exceed the collusively-agreed-to maximum. For example, suppose a
full athletic scholarship, known as a grant-in-aid, is worth $40,000 at both
schools. A student-athlete playing ice hockey may receive a 50% scholarship
worth $20,000 at the first school. If the school receiving the transferee offers
a 75% scholarship, which is worth $30,000, the total compensation for the
student would rise by $10,000. This amount, however, does not exceed the
maximum of $40,000. The bottom line is that transferring does not endan-
ger amateurism.
Paternalistic arguments about transferring are also not procompetitive.
According to the NCAA, sitting out a year is good for the student because it
provides the student-athlete with time to settle in and become accustomed
to the new surroundings.68 But this is disingenuous. When a student-athlete
transfers to a new school, she must adapt to a new environment. Although
the transferring student-athlete is not competing, she still practices and
trains with her new team. If it is necessary to provide time and opportunity
for transfer students to settle into a new environment, the training should
also be prohibited, or at least reduced. Second, the same logic would apply a
fortiori to freshmen. Freshmen often go from high schools with student bod-
ies of 1,500–2,000 to universities with 25,000–50,000 students. Some man-
age while some do not. Transfer student-athletes are no different, but no one
is advocating a return to ineligibility for freshman athletes.
B. Non-Solicitation Agreements
Much the same can be said about the non-solicitation agreements in
Bylaw 13.1.1.3. In spite of the Seventh Circuit’s approval of this anticompe-
titive bylaw in Deppe, it is hard to see how it could pass muster under a rule
of reason analysis. Neither the DOJ nor the FTC ultimately determines
whether a practice is unlawful, but these enforcement agencies believe that
non-solicitation agreements are unlawful per se. They have warned that the
DOJ will file criminal charges in non-solicitation cases.69
68 Alex Kirshner, NCAA transfer rules, explained quickly and honestly, SBNation
(May 9, 2018), https://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2018/5/9/17311748/
ncaa-transfer-rules-change-guide-list-sit-out, [https://perma.cc/2SAD-GB3C].
69 See Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div. & Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note
61, at 2.
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It should be relatively easy to establish a prima facie case that non-
solicitation agreements are anticompetitive. By definition, such agreements
restrain competition. There are also several cases involving no-poaching
agreements. None of these cases found agreements not to compete in the
labor market to be procompetitive.70
The NCAA cannot deny the existence of the agreement since it is in
black and white—Bylaw 13.1.1.3. Nor can the NCAA offer a legitimate
procompetitive justification for this restraint. In their Antitrust Guidance, the
DOJ and the FTC reject a defense involving cost reductions, so the NCAA
members cannot cry poverty. Resorting to claims that the restraint is neces-
sary to preserve amateurism should be unavailing.
V. Concluding Remarks
In Deppe, as in Agnew and again in Pugh, the Seventh Circuit found that
eligibility rules are presumptively procompetitive. This presumption, how-
ever, is flawed for two reasons. First, the requirement was obviously the
product of a collusive agreement that hinders competition among member
institutions for the services of student-athletes. The existence of the agree-
ment itself can hardly be denied since it is in Bylaw 14.5.5. Second, sitting
out means not participating (i.e., not competing), which is not obviously
procompetitive. Following a transfer, if the student-athlete would have
played but for the Transfer Regulation, the result is a lower-quality product.
Collusive reductions in product quality are not procompetitive.
In its Deppe opinion, the Seventh Circuit has blessed anticompetitive
conduct by the NCAA and its members. Neither the transfer rules nor the
non-solicitation rules should be considered presumptively procompetitive. Both
are plainly anticompetitive, and neither would pass muster under a rule of
reason analysis.
70 See, e.g., AMN Healthcare, Inc. v. Aya Healthcare Serv., Inc., 28 Cal. App. 5th
923, 930 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018). Non-solicitation agreements have come under fire as
unfair methods of competition under California state law.
